Wage inflation and labour conflicts in the Netherlands: an empirical investigation using the co-integration approach by den Butter, F.A.G. & van de Wijngaert, R.F.
VU Research Portal
Wage inflation and labour conflicts in the Netherlands: an empirical investigation using
the co-integration approach
den Butter, F.A.G.; van de Wijngaert, R.F.
published in
European Journal of Political Economy
1992
DOI (link to publisher)
10.1016/0176-2680(92)90039-J
Link to publication in VU Research Portal
citation for published version (APA)
den Butter, F. A. G., & van de Wijngaert, R. F. (1992). Wage inflation and labour conflicts in the Netherlands: an
empirical investigation using the co-integration approach. European Journal of Political Economy, 8, 527-541.
https://doi.org/10.1016/0176-2680(92)90039-J
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
E-mail address:
vuresearchportal.ub@vu.nl
Download date: 22. May. 2021
European Journal of Political Economy 8 (1992) 527-541. North-Holland 
Wage inflation and labour conflicts in 
the Netherlands 
An empirical investigation using the co-integration 
approach 
F.A.G. den Butter and R.F. van de Wijngaert* 
Free University, Amsterdam, Netherlands and Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, Netherlands 
The ‘wage space’, which is defined as the sum of price inflation and labour productivity growth, 
has played a major role as an indicator of allowable wage increases in the post-war wage 
negotiations in the Netherlands. This paper shows that: (a) wages and the wage space are co- 
integrated; (b) the deviation between wages and the wage space may act as an error correction 
term in the wage equation when both variables are identified as I(2); and (c) political consensus 
and the threat of labour conflicts (rather than actual strike activity) may be identified as the 
‘mechanism’ behind this error correction in the wage equation. 
1. Introduction 
Institutional aspects play a prominent part in labour relations and 
theoretical and empirical modelling in this field of economics may differ from 
country to country. Against this background we look at the specific role of 
the so-called wage space in wage negotiations in the Netherlands. The wage 
space is defined as the sum of price inflation and labour productivity growth. 
Wage negotiations between employers’ federations and trade union fede- 
rations in the Netherlands are traditionally conducted at a central level, and 
the wage space indicates the room for manoeuvre of negotiators from a 
macroeconomic point of view. This paper investigates to what extent the 
wage space has been a leading determinant in wage formation and to what 
extent (temporary) deviations of wages from the wage space have led to 
labour conflicts. The consensus on wages following the wage space may be 
interpreted as a ‘protocol’ to prevent labour unrest: Any deviation from the 
protocol which is unfavourable to the employees may cause the penalty of 
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strike. This interpretation, in fact, comes close to joint cost theory, which 
predicts that those contingencies which will lead to expensive strikes are 
covered in an advance agreement, or protocol [see Kennan (1986)]. 
The paper is set out as follows. After an institutional survey in the next 
section, section 3 first determines the order of integration of variables defined 
in this study and then tests for co-integration between wages and the wage 
space in order to see whether there is a stable long-run relationship between 
these two variables. Section 4 gives an empirical analysis of the contribution 
of labour conflicts to this relationship, whilst section 5 shows how both the 
wage space and the threat of labour conflicts play a dual role as the error 
correction mechanism in the wage formation process. Some conclusions are 
drawn in section 6. 
2. Institutional survey 
In the post-war period we distinguish four different regimes in wage 
negotiation and wage formation in the Netherlands. The first regime 
identified the 1945-1962 period. This period is characterized by the so-called 
‘strictly guided wage policy’, when wages were determined at the national 
level. The main aim of this government wage policy was to have wage 
increases restricted to the growth rate of labour productivity; at the same 
time the government pursued a strict price policy. During this regime, a 
governmental institution had the formal power to invalidate wage increases 
which were inconsistent with the government’s objectives. However, in the 
last three years of this period (1960-1962), the government allowed inter- 
industry variation in wage increases. 
The second regime, from 1963 to 1969, formed a transitional stage. Wage 
determination alternated between free negotiations and government interven- 
tion. Wages in industries were negotiated with an eye to both the producti- 
vity of the industry itself and a national trend. From 1963 to 1969 wages 
were determined freely at the industry level except for 1966 and 1967. The 
third regime lasted from 1970 to 1982. In this period, wage formation in the 
private sector became formally free of government intervention. However, the 
government kept its authority to interfere in the wage formation process if 
the outcomes of the ‘free negotiations’ were inconsistent with its economic 
policy objectives. In such cases, the government could issue so-called 
national wage pauses, which froze the level of wages for half a year but left 
the automatic price compensation schemes (which existed from 1969 to 1982) 
unaffected. It is important to notice that the centralized structure of wage 
determination remained intact in this regime. Before the start of the yearly 
negotiation rounds in the industries and/or enterprises, central negotiation 
rounds took place between the trade union federations, the employers’ 
federations and the government. The aim of these meetings was to provide 
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Fig. 1. Wages and the wage space, 195&1989 (percentage changes) 
Source: Central Planning Bureau. 
guidelines for the negotiations at industry and enterprise level with respect to 
limits for wage increases against the background of macroeconomic develop- 
ment. The fourth wage formation regime runs from 1983 to the present date. 
After a central agreement in 1982, the government ended its forma1 
interference in wage negotiations. However, the government still indicates 
which wage increase would be desirable from a macroeconomic policy point 
of view. This indication has an immediate impact on wage negotiations both 
at the central and at the industry or enterprise level. 
This survey shows that, in all four regimes, wage negotiations in the 
Netherlands have consistently been guided by directives at a central level. 
With this interventionist government policy, the sum of labour productivity 
and consumer price increases has always acted as a main indicator for 
allowable nominal wage increases in the market sector. The post-war history 
of wage formation in the Netherlands therefore suggests a stable relationship 
between changes in wages and the wage space. This institutional aspect, 
rather than a theoretical framework, constitutes the basis for our empirical 
study in this paper. Under this standard for allowable wage increase, we 
recognize that fluctuations in the terms of trade are shifted to the employers, 
and a deterioration will therefore increase the share of labour in the national 
income, as do wage increases which exceed the wage space. 
At first sight tig. 1 confirms the suggestion of a firm link between wage 
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increases and the wage space. It also shows, however, that wage increases 
have exceeded the wage space in a number of years (especially during the 
periods 1953-1958 and 1968-1974), and, moreover, at the beginning of the 
1980s the wage space had not been completely exhausted by wage increases. 
Note that the wage space is defined in growth rates since it relates to 
allowable wage increases; when looking at levels, the appropriate comparison 
is thus between the cumulated wage space and the wage level. 
In spite of this link between the wage rate and the wage space, the 
distribution of income has exhibited large shifts in the post-War period. The 
share of labour in the national income, as measured by the labour income 
ratio (the precise definition is in the appendix), has fluctuated around 72”/,, in 
the 1950s. However, wage increases which exceeded the wage space in the 
1960s and 197Os, and the deterioration of the terms of trade due to the oil- 
crises shocks, have contributed to a steady rise in the labour income ratio 
from 72% in 1961 to 92% in 1981. Since 1982 this ratio has dropped (being 
79% in 1989) due to union wage restraints and an improvement in the terms 
of trade. 
3. Co-integration of wages and wage space in the Netherlands 
Prior to the testing of the existence of a long-run relationship between 
wages and the wage space by co-integration tests, we should determine their 
order of integration as well as the order of integration of the other variables 
of this study’ [see, e.g., Engle and Granger (1987); and Hall and Henry 
(1988)]. Table 1 presents results derived from a number of unit root tests 
which test for AR(l) or AR(p) processes: DW is the Durbin-Watson test; DF 
is the Dickey-Fuller test without a constant term; DF, the Dickey-Fuller test 
including a constant term; and DF, the Dickey-Fuller test with a trend. The 
test results under the headings ADF relate to the augmented Dickey-Fuller 
tests, defined in an analogous way. For all relevant variables the integration 
tests have been performed both on levels, on first differences (growth rates), 
and where necessary on the first differences of growth rates. The null- 
hypothesis of both the DW-test and the Dickey-Fuller test is the existence of 
a unit root. This null-hypothesis is rejected when the DW-statistic exceeds its 
critical value given at the bottom line of table 1; whereas a DF-statistic 
which is below its critical value, leads to a rejection of the null-hypothesis2 
‘The appendix gives the list of symbols and provides short definitions of the variables 
specified in this study. 
‘For the DW-test the null-hypothesis reads that the correlation between the error terms 
equals 1, or DW=O, which implies that the variable will be integrated of integration order I, 
I(l), if the DW-statistic is below its critical level. The null-hypothesis of the DF-test is that the 
correlation between the lirst difference of a variable and its lagged level is 0, which alternatively 
implies that the variable will be integrated of order I, f(l), if the t-value of the estimated 
correlation coeflicient is insignificant. 
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Table 1 


























DF DF, DF, ADF 
+ 7.47 - 2.20 + 7.98 +0.79 
- 1.26 -2.00 - 1.39 -0.81 













































logh + 8.05 
Alog h (Ii) -2.15 
Ah -8.16 
log ws +11.1 - 1.35 +7.10 
Alog ws (w’s) - 1.61 -3.15 -2.16 
AWk ~ 9.42 -9.28 -9.32 
gap (level) -0.51 -1.52 -2.09 -1.71 
gcip (%-change) -4.77 -4.79 -4.70 - 4.09 
:a 
+ 1.13 -O.Oil -1.39 ~ 1.13 
-2.91 - 2.95 - 2.98 - 3.86 
tP + 3.33 - 1.02 +2.50 + 2.08 - 1.39 
AtP - 3.76 - 4.94 -4.18 -2.64 -3.61 
log wdl - 1.64 -5.91 - 3.04 -1.10 - 5.03 
aiq -0.18 - 1.17 + 0.62 -0.09 - 1.43 
Aaiq - 5.48 -5.41 - 5.44 -4.80 -4.74 
aiq, + 1.17 - 0.92 + 0.12 + 1.28 - 1.07 
Aaiq, -6.19 - 6.40 - 6.25 -4.84 -5.14 
Critical values - 1.95 - 2.93 - 3.50 - 1.95 - 2.93 
(a = 5%, n = 50) 
“The dot notation indicates a percentage change; the ADF-test is specified with a one year lag; 
when in the last column two figures for the order of integration are given the test statistics are 
inconclusive. 
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As wages are mainly determined in annual contracts, we have based our 
empirical analysis on annual data. This results in a relatively low number of 
observations - only 40. Therefore, the discriminatory power of the tests is 
low so that, as indicated in the last column of table 1, the order of 
integration of a number of variables cannot be determined unambiguously. 
This ambiguity also characterizes the findings of Graafland and Huizinga 
(1988). In order to interpret the time-series properties of the variables, 
Dolado and Jenkinson (1987) advocate the procedure of testing for a unit 
root in the most general model, including a constant and a trend term. If the 
null-hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected, one should proceed with 
the more restricted model by first dropping the trend term, and if necessary 
also the constant. Unfortunately some test results remain inconsistent: We 
find the wage gap to be Z(l), while its two component parts, the wage level 
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Table 2 
Co-integration regressions under the presumption that wages are of order I(l), 195G-1989.” 
logw=a,logp,+cc,log h +~Jogws+a,u+ f$u- 1 +cxStp. 
%logP, a,log h a,log ws %‘$I4 c&-, a5tP R2 -CRDW DF ADF 
(a) 0.71 1.49 _ 0.9986 0.56 -2.10 -2.58 
(14.5) (22.8) 
(b) 1.07 1.17 -1.69 - 0.9992 0.92 -3.05 -3.59 
(13.8) (14.8) (5.3) 
(c) 1.07 1.17 - _ - 1.80 - 0.9996 1.10 ~ 3.48 -4.60 
(24.8) (25.3) ( 10.4) 
(d) 0.99 0.95 ~ 1.77 1.00 0.9998 1.57 -4.90 -4.10 
(31.0) (28.9) (15.0) (6.5) 
(e) 0.97 - 1.72 0.98 0.9998 1.57 -4.87 -4.12 
(44.9) (20.5) (6.8) 
“The constant is omitted to save space; t-values in parentheses; the asterisk (*) denotes an 
alternative specification possibility; the ADF is specified with a one year lag. 
and the cumulated wage space are 1(2) and an undecided Z(2), 1(l), 
respectively. 
The most puzzling outcome of these integration tests is the clear indication 
that wages are Z(2), whereas the cumulated wage space and its component 
parts are undecided 1(l) or I(2). From a statistical point of view, the most 
intelligible decision is to regard the cumulated wage space as Z(2) and hence 
to test for co-integration between wage increases and the wage space, which 
under this assumption are both 1(l). This is in conformity with the 
institutional survey and with visual inspection on fig. 1. However, this 
implies specifying a (short-run) wage equation in second differences (with the 
acceleration of the wages as the dependent variable), which is rather unusual. 
Therefore we will follow two parallel lines of examination, and investigate 
co-integration on the presumption that wages are either 1(2) or 1(l). In the 
latter case we overrule the outcomes of the integration tests. 
The next step is to estimate the co-integration regression. In case two 
variables, x and y, are co-integrated, the residuals of the estimated regression 
between x and y must be stationary, i.e., of integration order I(0). For this 
purpose the same tests as that used for stationarity are used, but with a 
different null-hypothesis: The null-hypothesis reads now that the residuals 
have a unit root. So, when the value of the DW-statistic (commonly called 
‘the CRDW-statistic’) exceeds its critical value, or when the DF-statistics are 
significant (are below their critical levels), the null-hypothesis is rejected 
against the alternative hypothesis of co-integration.3 
On the presumption, first, that wages are of order 1(l), table 2 gives the 
estimation results for a number of alternative specifications. Eq. (a) gives the 
‘Critical values for the DF-test (and the ADF-test) are: - 3.67 ( - 3.25), -4.11 (- 3.65), -4.35 
(-3.95), -4.76 (-4.25), for 2, 3, 4 and 5 variables, respectively. See Engle and Granger (1987), 
and Blangiewicz and Charemza (1989). 
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long-run wage equation with the price level and labour productivity as 
explanatory variables. Modern bargaining theory, however, suggests the 
inclusion of other variables like the unemployment level, the level of taxes, 
and a variable capturing the difference in value added and consumer prices 
[for recent applications for the Netherlands see, e.g., Knoester and Van der 
Windt (1987); Graafland and Huizinga (1988); and Lever (1990)]. Eq. (b) 
therefore shows the co-integration regression including the unemployment 
level as an explanatory variable. This inclusion is statistically sound, as, 
according to table 1, unemployment is also Z(1). However, the tit of 
unemployment appears to be much improved by specifying it with a one year 
lag [eq. (c) of table 23, which is not formally compatible with the 
specification of a co-integration regression, since the long-run equation 
cannot be dynamically specified. There is, however, an economic justification 
underlying this specification change; wages are typically negotiated at the 
beginning of the year, whereas data on current unemployment are forecasts 
which have often proved to be unreliable. 4 Eq. (d) extends the specification 
of the long-run wage equation with another variable suggested by modern 
wage bargaining theory, namely the burden of taxation. Now the hypothesis 
of co-integration is no longer rejected. We have also attempted to include the 
difference between consumer prices and value added prices as an explanatory 
variable (not shown in table 2). However, this variable appeared not to be 
significant in the regressions, and when we corrected the wage space for 
value added prices (i.e., defining the ‘corrected’ wage space as the sum of 
value added prices and labour productivity) the test statistics indicated that 
there is no co-integration between wages and the ‘corrected’ wage space. 
Finally eq. (e) combines the price level and labour productivity into one 
explanatory variable: The cumulated wage space. The regression result hardly 
differs from that of eq. (d). 
Eq. (e) of table 2 is our preferred long-run wage equation under the 
assumption that wages are of order I(1). According to this equation a long- 
run relationship between the cumulated wage space and the wage level only 
exists under the ceteris paribus condition of no permanent changes in 
unemployment and taxation policy. 
Table 3 gives the results of the co-integration regression under the 
presumption that wages, the (cumulated) wage space, and its component 
parts are of order I(2).5 The regressions are specified both with and without 
a constant term. According to the test statistics, all regressions of the table 
except (a) indicate co-integration between wages and the wage space 
4Graafland and Huizinga (1988) also use a lagged unemployment variable in their specifica- 
tion of the long-term wage equation for the Netherlands. 
‘Note that neither the unemployment rate nor the tax variable can appear in the co- 
integration regression, if we assume that the other explanatory variables are of integration order 
02). 
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Table 3 
Co-integration regressions under the presumption that wages are I(2), 
195G-1989.” 
PO B,dc 0 [i,Wi R2 CRDW DF ADF 
(a) 0.94 1.05 0.75 - 0.714 1.23 - 4.08 - 3.20 
(1.1) (8.4) (4.7) 
(b) 1.14 0.87 0.712 1.44 -4.62 - 3.67 
(I 1.7) (6.9) 
(c) 0.82 0.94 0.706 1.43 -4.48 -3.81 
(1.0) (9.6) 
(d) - 1.02 0.706 1.61 -4.95 -4.28 
(23.1) 
“t-Values in parentheses; the ADF is specified with a one year lag. 
variables6 We prefer the parsimonious specification (d). As the coefficient of 
the wage space in this equation does not differ significantly from unity, we 
set it equal to unity. By defining the wage gap (gtip) as the difference between 
wage growth and the wage space, a simple DF-test confirms the alleged long- 
term relationship between wages and wage space, without ceteris paribus 
conditions. The presumption that wages are I(2) therefore enables us, as we 
shall see, to give an economic interpretation of the error correction 
mechanism. 
4. Labour conflicts and the wage space 
The dominant role of the wage space in Dutch wage negotiations poses 
the question of whether wage offers by employers associations, which are far 
below the wage space, or wage demands by trade unions which are far above 
the wage space, lead to tension in the negotiation process and hence to 
labour conflicts. If this is so, the threat of labour conflicts would act as a 
stabilizing device in the long-run relationship between wages and wage space. 
Strike activity may be regarded as an empirical measure of labour conflicts. 
We have therefore tested the hypothesis above using a regression equation 
with strike activity, measured as the logarithm of the number of working 
days lost in strikes (log wdl), as the dependent variable, and either the wage 
gap, or the cumulated wage gap, as the independent variable; the cumulated 
wage gap (gap, see list of symbols) being defined as the difference between 
wages and the cumulated wage space. 
A regression explaining strike activity by means of the cumulated wage 
gap did not yield a satisfactory tit. Moreover, from table 1 we learn that 
‘Including a variable which corrected for the difference between the change of value added 
prices and consumer prices, or defining the wage space in value added prices gave problems 
identical to those mentioned above. 
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Table 4 
Strikes and the labour income ratio, 195C1989.” 
logwdl=y,+y,daiq_,+y,daiq,_l. 
YO ylAaiq_, ri&iq,-, 82 DW 
(a) + 3.77 -0.34 0.16 1.77 
(18.4) (2.8) 
(b) +3.84 - -0.32 0.19 1.76 
(19.0) (3.1) 
“t-Values in parentheses 
log wdl is of order I(O), while gap is of order I( 1). Therefore, we restrict the 
analysis of the relationship between labour conflicts and the wage space to a 
specification where strike activity is explained by changes in the wage gap 
(grip). This is in line with the institutional survey which suggests that the 
wage space itself rather than the cumulated wage space has been regarded as 
the room for allowable wage increases. The following equation describes this 
relationship between strike activity and the extent to which the wage space 
has been used for wage increases (reference period 1950-1989, t-values in 
parentheses). 
logwdl=3.85-0.2lg@, R2 DW 
(17.9) (2.3) 0.10 1.86 (1) 
The wage-gap variable in this equation is specified with a one year lag. An 
explanation for this lag is that wage negotiations, and hence strike activity in 
the Netherlands, takes place in the beginning of the year when only 
macroeconomic data for the previous year are available to the negotiators. 
Moreover, the introduction of this lag unambiguously defines the direction of 
causality in the relationship between strike activity and wage increases 
investigated in this section [for more empirical research into this causal 
relationship, see Den Butter (1989)]. For the wage gap variable we find a 
significant coefficient value with the expected negative sign. Eq. (1) above 
predicts a high level of strike activity in the next year, when this year’s 
negotiations have resulted in wage increases which are below the wage space. 
On the other hand, there will be little strike activity in the next year when a 
high wage increase as compared to the wage space is obtained.’ 
The estimation result for eq. (a) in table 4 shows that the change in the 
labour income ratio (daiq) as a determinant of strike activity yields a 
somewhat better fit than the wage gap variable in eq. (1). In practice, the 
difference between a change in the wage gap and a change in the labour 
‘Lagging the wage gap more than one year, using a combination of weighted averages or a 
cumulation of the wage gap, did not improve the explanation significantly. 
